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Book Review

THE GREAT DISSENT: HOW OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES CHANGED HIS
MIND—AND CHANGED THE HISTORY
OF FREE SPEECH IN AMERICA, by
Thomas Healy1
JAMIE CAMERON*
HE FASCINATES US STILL—Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., valorous Civil War
veteran, covert flirt and philanderer, self-styled bettabilitarian,2 and legendary,
word-pirouetting justice of the US Supreme Court. The Great Dissent reprises his
legacy once more in a book on one of Holmes’s most dramatic moments at the
US Court: The day he dissented in United States v Abrams.3
“Clear and present danger” was no more than literary flair in March 1919,
when Holmes wrote a trio of decisions upholding Espionage Act convictions
against ragtag dissidents and Eugene Debs, leader of the Socialist Party and

*

Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School.

1.
2.

(New York: Metropolitan Books, 2013) 352 pages.
A bettabilitarian sees the universe as a mystery and believes that there are no certainties.
See Healy, ibid at 116. As Holmes explained, “We can never know anything for certain;
we can only place bets one way or another. Like any gambler, however, we should gather as
much information as possible before wagering our money or our lives. Only then can we be
confident in the bets we have made” (ibid at 205).
250 US 616 (1919) [Abrams].

3.
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four-time candidate for US President.4 Short months after introducing that artful
but limpid concept in Schenck, Holmes had an epiphany that changed the course
of First Amendment history.5 By November, he would reconstitute clear and
present danger and pair it with a bravura defence of free speech’s timeless virtues.
Not only was it an utter surprise, his Abrams dissent could hardly have been more
convincingly or gloriously written.
Holmes’s turnaround from Schenck to Abrams is a favourite in American
constitutional lore, and the intrigue surrounding the justice’s dizzying reversal
lingers on. Thomas Healy’s The Great Dissent retreads familiar ground but layers
the narrative by humanizing the judge and tracing the genesis of his newfound
constitutional faith in free speech. In doing so, the author puts the venerated
justice’s flaws on view: Not only is Holmes something of a philanderer, he has
needs, fears, and insecurities. Approaching his eighties, the judge doubts himself
but seeks solace in acolytes who are among the thought leaders of the day. That
is how a coterie principally comprising Harold Laski, Felix Frankfurter, and
Zechariah Chafee Jr. educated Holmes in the critical period between Schenck and
Abrams and played a central role in the free speech drama of 1919.
Though it is hagiography of a sort, The Great Dissent tells an affecting story
of how reverse mentoring led to a teachable moment for Holmes. If the justice
lacked the humility to admit being wrong in the Schenck trilogy, he had the
courage and resilience in Abrams to abandon his preconceived views and see
freedom of speech a completely different way: not as logic but as experience.6

I. FROM “CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER” TO CLEAR AND
PRESENT DANGER
The First Amendment commanded little attention before WWI and the
enactment of federal espionage and sedition legislation. America’s late entry
into the war was divisive, and resistance to conscription generated prosecutions,
convictions, and the Schenck trilogy. By then, Holmes was alert to the crackdown
on opposition to the war and other forms of dangerous, radical speech. In June
4.
5.
6.

Schenck v United States, 249 US 47 (1919) [Schenck]; Frohwerk v United States, 249 US 204
(1919) [Frohwerk]; Debs v United States, 249 US 211 (1919) [Debs] [the Schenck trilogy].
Debs ran for President a fifth and final time in 1920, from his jail cell.
US Const amend I [First Amendment]. The First Amendment states, in part, “Congress shall
make no law … abridging the freedom of speech.”
“The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience.” See Oliver Wendell Holmes,
The Common Law, ed by Mark DeWolfe Howe (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard
University Press, 1963) at 5.
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1918, he was unsuccessfully coached on First Amendment issues by federal court
judge Learned Hand during a chance encounter on the train between New York
City and Boston. Much enamoured of his own free speech opinion in Masses
Publishing Co v Patten, Hand had been praised by progressive intellectuals and
was looking to promote his ideas up to the US Supreme Court.7
Not only was Holmes decidedly unmoved, the Holmes-Hand correspondence
of the period shows that the two simply did not connect. At this time, Holmes
hewed to logic in his views; as he put it, “Free speech stands no differently than
freedom from vaccination.”8 He, too, had been praised for his biting dissents in the
Lochner line of cases, which pushed back against laissez-faire constitutionalism—
or “Lochnering”—and adopted a steadfast posture of judicial deference to the
legislature.9 To be consistent, Holmes needed a reason to treat speech differently
and had not found one.10
Accordingly, there is little suggestion the Schenck trilogy posed a challenge to
an untroubled US Supreme Court or the judge who wrote unanimous opinions
unceremoniously dismissing the First Amendment. Yet Holmes’s love for turn of
phrase found voice in the pronouncement that free speech depends on “whether
the words used … create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that [the US] Congress has a right to prevent.”11 Though a neat
touch, clear and present danger was without doctrinal significance at the time.12
A few months later, in 1919, three US Supreme Court colleagues visited
Holmes at home on Friday, 7 November to entreat him, in the name of national
security, to withdraw his upcoming dissent in Abrams.13
The following Monday, the recalcitrant judge read that dissent in open court.
It was an unexpected, stunning, and profound reversal of the Schenck trilogy—in
spirit and essence if not by the letter of the law. Holmes elevated the casual

7.
8.
9.
10.

244 F 535 (SDNY 1917) [Masses].
Healy, supra note 1 at 24 (quoting a letter from Holmes to Hand).
Lochner v New York, 198 US 45 (1905) (invalidating hours of work legislation for bakers).
Put another way, “[W]e should deal with the act of speech as we deal with any other overt act
that we don’t like.” See Healy, supra note 1 at 38 (quoting a letter from Holmes to Laski).
11. Schenck, supra note 5 at 52.
12. The concept was not applied in Frohwerk or Debs, and the trilogy upheld all convictions.
Chafee’s timely Harvard Law Review article suggested how felicitous words could be
transformed into commanding doctrine. See Healy, supra note 1 at 59.
13. Ibid at 213.
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language of clear and present danger to an imperative First Amendment standard14
and scorned the sentence of twenty years’ imprisonment for the “surreptitious
publishing of a silly leaflet by an unknown man.”15 For good measure, he added
a theory of speech that drew on a lifetime of engagement with philosophy.16
Whereas a more pedantic jurist might have inscribed a bibliographic account of
free speech, Holmes was at his stylistic and original best in Abrams.
It can be spectacular when judges change their minds. The “switch in time
that saved nine” may have averted President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s 1937
plan to pack the US Supreme Court to ensure that his New Deal legislation
would survive judicial scrutiny, but Owen Roberts won few plaudits for fatefully
changing his vote to save the US Supreme Court.17 Years later, Learned Hand—
who had dared to lecture Holmes on free speech in 1918—played a key role in the
First Amendment’s nadir during the 1950s.18 The author of the celebrated Masses
opinion likewise received few plaudits for masterminding Cold War balancing,
which brought free speech to a low and would be all but dismissed in the 1960s.
Abrams stands on different ground; it was pivotal not only because clear
and present danger emerged as a doctrinal command but also because Holmes
proposed a theory of free speech that is powerful and enduring. To this day, it is
one of the First Amendment’s ideological bedrocks.19

II. REVERSE MENTORING
Despite the finesse, Holmes all but reversed his views on free speech between
Schenck and Abrams; a conversion that appeared to take place quickly was in
fact painstaking for the judge. Holmes took pride in setting himself apart and
14. Abrams, supra note 3 at 630 (stating, among other things, that “we should be eternally
vigilant against attempts to check the expression of opinions that we loathe and believe
to be fraught with death, unless they so imminently threaten immediate interference
with the lawful and pressing purposes of the law that an immediate check is required to
save the country”).
15. Ibid at 628. Abrams and others had urged workers to strike, not in opposition to the war, but
to support the Bolshevik Revolution.
16. Abrams is best known for its conception of free speech as a “marketplace of ideas.” Ibid.
17. See West Coast Hotel Co v Parrish, 300 US 379 (1937).
18. See Dennis v United States, 341 US 494 (1951) (relying on Hand’s ad hoc balancing test to
uphold the anti-Communist Smith Act).
19. See also West Virginia Board of Education v Barnette, 319 US 624 (1943) (protecting,
under the First Amendment, students from being forced to salute the American flag);
New York Times Co v Sullivan, 376 US 254 (1964) (protecting defamation under the First
Amendment); Whitney v California, 274 US 357 (1927) (Brandeis, concurring).
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was fond of disdaining “the upwarders and onwarders.”20 He claimed he was an
“ideaist,” not a “thingster” like Louis Brandeis and other crusaders who bore
down on details in their aspiration to change the world.21 By contrast, Holmes
was aloof—intellectually regal—and pridefully unconcerned with facts and the
tribulations of the day.22
Still, he was stung by criticism of the Schenck trilogy, and especially of Debs.
Holmes was chastised by The New Republic, a relatively new and forward-looking
publication, and that hurt: The New Republic’s views usually aligned with his
own, and the magazine was “like family” to him.23 The quandary was that
Holmes could not take a consistent position on laissez-faire and free speech
issues without displeasing the progressives but did not see the difference between
limits on speech and hours of work legislation. The task of showing him fell to
Laski, among others.
Courted by many, Holmes was particularly attracted to Harold Laski—
the son he never had—for his “astounding erudition.”24 Laski was “brilliant,
prolific, charming, effusive, irrepressible, and a notorious self-promoter;” and
“of all the young men who had wriggled their way into the justice’s heart, he was
Holmes’s favorite.”25 During Laski’s short years at Harvard, Holmes basked in the
intellectual light the younger man brought into his life. Over the New England
summer of 1919, Holmes indulged his unquenchable thirst for knowledge,
reading more than fifty books, which Laski supplemented with strategically
chosen titles. Though he grumbled, Holmes read most of Laski’s selections, and
the two men spent happy hours sparring about ideas and thinkers across the ages.
Inviting Zechariah Chafee Jr. for tea that summer was one of Laski’s schemes.
Chafee was a rising scholar who had written on free speech and the Schenck trilogy
in The New Republic and the Harvard Law Review.26 Holmes was well aware of
Chafee’s work on the First Amendment, and the two younger men worked hard
at the tea party to bring the judge around to their point of view.
20. Healy, supra note 1 at 127.
21. Ibid.
22. Like father, like son: Holmes Sr. complained that “facts choked his windpipe when he
talked,” and his son confessed that “I hate facts” and “wish to know as little as I can safely go
on.” See Healey, ibid at 140-41.
23. On 16 November 1918, The New Republic published an article by Chafee that was critical
of Holmes. See Healey, ibid at 59. After the trilogy, The New Republic published a scathing
critique of Debs by Ernst Freund on 3 May 1919 (ibid at 134-35).
24. Ibid at 33-34.
25. Ibid at 30.
26. Laski made sure that Holmes had a copy of the Harvard Law Review article, “Freedom of
Speech in War Time.” See Healey, ibid at 154.
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Correspondence suggests that slowly, and guardedly, Holmes began to
question his intellectual instincts. In the roiling climate of postwar America, he
was not jolted from the complacency of his views until Laski was almost run out
of Harvard, in fall 1919, for his radical acts and views.27 Urged to intervene on his
friend’s behalf and play a broader public role in the service of free speech, Holmes
begged off, citing workload. If the judge’s refusal to engage disappointed, at some
point in this interim, free speech ceased to be a matter of cold logic and became
lived experience for him.28
Holmes was notorious for writing with great speed and force of will; as
Brandeis quipped, “He doesn’t give a fellow a chance—he shoots so quickly.”29
The justice wrote at a standing desk and liked to boast that “[n]othing conduces
to brevity like a caving in of the knees.”30 By any standard, including his own,
the Abrams dissent was exceptional. The appeal was argued on 21 October
1919, and by 1 November, Holmes was telling Frankfurter about an opinion he
had just written “quasi in furore,” as if possessed.31 Once he put the pen down,
Holmes would never again flinch, and from that day forward, he defended free
speech to the limit.
The Abrams dissent was unexpected, though not entirely uncharacteristic of
Holmes. Given the “intense lobbying effort” by his closest friends and admirers,
some might describe Laski, Frankfurter, and Chafee as opportunists and portray
Holmes as an aging jurist seeking to preserve his stature among those who had
reflexively praised him over the years.32 But he was a free thinker, and such
an unkind view understates the force of Holmes’s intellect, which was at once
fearless, proud, and resilient. If it might not have happened without the reverse
mentoring, the Abrams dissent was singular just the same.

III. PURSUE THE UNKNOWN END
Hagiography runs the risk of not being taken seriously. Perhaps that is why
Healy steered away from the key narrative to infer that Holmes’s marriage
was not fulfilling, point out his wandering eye, and exploit the details of his
27. Frankfurter had also come under fire for his views about labour policy. See Healey,
ibid at 121-31.
28. Holmes’s “logic of persecution” was “suddenly, concrete and personal.” See
Healey, ibid at 195.
29. Ibid at 104.
30. Ibid at 95.
31. Ibid at 211.
32. Ibid at 201.
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lovesick affair with an Irish noblewoman. Otherwise, Holmes’s vulnerabilities
around aging were assuaged in more constructive relationships. Fearing old age
and the prospect he might become useless, Holmes sought intellectual comfort
and intimacy in the company of brilliant younger men—principally Laski and
Frankfurter. As he affectionately confided to Frankfurter, “You have brought a
great deal of comfort and companionship to the natural loneliness of old age.”33
It was unusual, but fortuitous, that in this instance the mentoring between
generations moved in both directions.
Importantly, the Abrams dissent marked a turning point in Holmes’s thought,
when he saw the connection between his deep-seated bettabilitarian skepticism
and a sound, philosophic conception of free speech. A few years later he would
write, “If I were dying my last words would be: Have faith and pursue the unknown
end.”34 At some point between Schenck and Abrams, Holmes grasped that the
unknown cannot be pursued under the logic of persecution he had defended so
valiantly. That was the vital difference between free speech and freedom from
vaccination, hours of work laws, and assorted forms of regulation—and it was
why Holmes came to believe that speech must be fearlessly protected, even to the
brink of irreversible peril.

33. Ibid at 163.
34. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to John Ching Hsiung Wu (1924) in Harry C
Shriver, ed, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes: His Book Notices and Uncollected Letters and Papers,
1st ed (New York: Central Book, 1936) at 175.

